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Law, Liberalisation and Globalisation in India: Just 






This paper is a part of a larger research on the working of business law in 
India in the changing context of globalisation and liberalisation. The macro 
theme requires details of the changes in law, economy and business in 
different fields. However, as the changes in the economy were in a nascent 
stage, the details were yet to emerge. Now, after a decade of reforms, 
changes in different fields are beginning to be discernible. Towards creating a 
corpus on the working of law in its micro details, this paper takes up the law 
on holding of games, contests and lotteries for promotion of products and 
services. With liberalisation, as entry into production and services is no more 
a barrier, firms have got into aggressive and competitive trade practices to 
entice the customers. This has included proliferation of games, contests, 
lotteries and similar promotional schemes. The paper explores the working of 
the provision on the subject, contained in the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, and finds out that while the business practices in the 
post-liberalisation-globalisation period required better regulation, the 
interpretation of the law by the courts has made the law non-existent.  
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Law, Liberalisation and Globalisation in India: Just 
a Game of Chance?  
 
 
The failure to build legal capacity in matters concerning the 
economy is as grave as the failure to build capacity in our roads, 
railways, ports and airports. As India integrates itself with the 




The fervent call was only to be expected. In the pre-liberalisation period, law 
making and judicial interpretation in the field of economy and business, fitted 
into the political economy of the state. State was the largest deployer of 
capital. For private capital, entry into production was dependent on accessing 
the bureaucratic-political alignment of the state to secure requisite permits 
and licenses. However, for those who could secure this access, a market was 
relatively secured.
2 In this arrangement, judicial interpretation and 
intervention, more often, was in review of actions and decisions of the state 
itself. There was a limit to which the judiciary, a part of the state formation 
itself, could question the state. The legal institutions, knowledges and 
capacities in the field of law, economy and business were built around this 
formation. 
 
With liberalisation of the economy, which started in 1985
3, but was formally 
inaugurated and given a thrust to in 1991, entry into production and services 
                                             
1 The quote becomes even more relevant as it comes from an ex-finance 
minister, Chidambaram, P., ‘Law & Commerce: And the twain shall Meet’, 
The Sunday Express, OP-ED 7, Ahmedabad, October 26, 2003. 
 
2 On political economy of the Indian state in pre-liberalisation period, see 
Bardhan, Pranab, (1984): Political Economy of Development in India, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi; Kaviraj, Sudipta, (1988): A Critique of 
the Passive Revolution in India, Economic and Political Weekly, Special 
No., Vol. 23, Nos. 45-47, November, 1988; and Patnaik, Prabhat, (1985) 
Political Economy of Liberalisation in India, Social Scientist. 
 
 
3 See Patnaik, Prabhat, (1985) Political Economy of Liberalisation in India, 
Social Scientist. 
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is not a barrier in most of the sectors. The state has shown eagerness to 
disinvest its capital from the public sector. The foundation of the earlier 
formation is being dismantled, to make space for a new one to emerge. It is 
interesting to explore how a new order emerges from the womb of the old. 
Several questions arise. Does a new rationality, of market, competition and 
efficiency, as was celebrated, arise on its own with the dismantling of the 
state controlled system? Even before that, does a new ‘order of things’ at all 
gets created in a Foucauldian sense of different  ‘regimes of truth’
4. Or 
history, time and society admit of no ruptures. Thus, the celebration of 
‘liberalised’ India over the ‘licence permit raj’ itself is creation of a vacuous 
binary duality, to privilege one over the other without any foundation. The 
seemingly new is only a continuation of the old, manifesting the ‘globalised 
economy’ in its own provincialities? These questions have been asked, 
answered and contested for a decade now. However, as the concrete 
processes were yet to unfold, these issues have been debated either at the 
level of general ideas and principles or expressed just as opinions and 
predilections. After a decade of reforms, in different fields, changes, even if 
transient, are discernible. Towards grappling with the macro questions, we 
wish to examine the micro details of practices in the field of law, economy 
and business. 
 
In liberalised India, competitive thrust in the economy has got directed into 
two spheres. At the top end, firms have merged and amalgamated to enlarge 
the firm size, market share and resource base. Two, firms have got into 
aggressive and competitive trade practices to entice the customers. These 
practices raise questions about truthfulness and fairness of representation of 
products, services, advertisement, and schemes and modalities for promotion 
of products and services. The question will not be whether a consumer has 
adequate remedies and protection against unfair trade practices of a 
corporation but whether the warring corporations have adequate law against 
unfair trade practices, and a justice delivery system to have some ‘rules of the 
game’ to compete among themselves. 
 
                                             
4 See Michel, Foucault (1979): Discipline & Punish: the Birth of the Prison. 
New York: Vintage; and Michel, Foucault, (1980):  Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and other writings 1972-1977. C. Gordon, ed. New 
York: Pantheon and (1984).  
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This paper is on evolution of law and practices in the past 20 years on one 
aspect of unfair trade practices- unfairness in holding of games, contests, 
lotteries and similar schemes for promoting sales or utilisation of services. The 
state came to regulate unfair trade practices in 1984, before liberalisation and 
globalisation was inaugurated, by amending the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, 1969. Its birth was tied to the exigencies and context of 
the state controlled economy, largely in legitimating the political order
5. 
However, law once enacted, gets a life of its own. The law on unfair trade 
practices has come to be given a meaning in the changed context.  
 
MRTP Act: Law and its organisation 
 
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, (MRTP) was 
enacted to prevent monopolies and restrictive trade practices in the economy.  
In 1984, the MRTP Act was amended to add a chapter on Unfair Trade 
Practices. The MRTP Act created a body called the Director General of 
Investigation and Registration (DGIR). On a complaint, or on its own, the 
DGIR could investigate into a claim of a restrictive or unfair trade practice. 
The MRTP creates a judicial body called the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission. The DGIR was to take cases before the benches of the 
Commission. The Commission, on judging a practice to be an unfair trade 
practice, could order the offending party to cease and desist the practice. 
 
To understand the working of the law on unfair trade practices, we would 
need to examine specific provisions of the MRTP Act. Section 36 A lists unfair 
trade practices. This is the substantive ground on which the DGIR could start  
investigations and bring the matter before the MRTP Commission. The 
Commission could discontinue an unfair trade practice, under Section 36 D, if 
the practice was ‘prejudicial to the public interest, or to the interest of any 
consumer or consumers generally’. 
 
Section 36 A has five parts, called sub-sections. The five parts cover different 
themes. A summary of the five themes defining unfair trade practices is as 
follows: 
                                             
5 Oza, A. N. (1977): Committee on Company Law and MRTP Act: Exercise in 
Futility, Economic and Political Weekly, August 6, 1977; and Paranjape, H. 
K. (1984): The MRTP Amendment Bill: A Trojan Horse, Economic and 
Political Weekly, April 28, 1984.    5
 
36 A (1): False representation of products or services, including false 
description, guarantee, warranty or performance of a product or service.  
 
36 A (2): Advertisement of false bargain price. 
 
36 A (3): Contest, lotteries, game of chance or skill for promotion of 
sale.  
 
36 A (4) Sale of goods, not in conformity with safety standards provided 
by the law. 
 
36 A (5): Hoarding or destruction of goods, or refusal to sell goods. 
 
We now turn to an examination of the provision on holding of contests and 
game. We could excerpt the law and reproduce the one relevant for us.  
 
Section 36-A. ....  'unfair trade practice' means a trade practice which, for 
the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the 
provisions of any services, adopts one or more of the following practices 
and thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers of such goods or 







(3) permits - 
 
(a) the offering of gifts, prizes or other items with the intention of 
not providing them as offered or creating the impression that 
something is being given or offered free of charge when it is fully 
or partly covered by the amount charged in the transaction as a 
whole. 
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(b) the conduct of any contest, lottery, game of chance or skill, for 
the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the sale, use or 







In interpreting the above provision, The Commission took the position that 
once a scheme had an element of contest, or lottery through giving of 
coupons and other means, it attracted Section 36 (A)(3)(b). There are several 
illustrations of this. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. had introduced a campaign where a 
person could buy two soaps and enter a contest which made him eligible for 
prizes through a draw. This was held to be a contest. The British Airway had 
advertised a scheme where students who were flying by the British Airways to 
the U.S.A for studies could write 50 words on  how ‘he believes his further 
studies in the U.S.A. will help’. A panel of eminent members were to be the 
judges. Prize included  free air tickets. This was held to be a contest. 
 
Mid-Day, a newspaper, had announced the launching of a ‘pick-a-team’ 
contest. A contestant was to pick the ideal World XI Cricket Team using an 
entry form available in an issue of the newspaper.
6 The team selected by the 
contestants was to be matched with the team selected by a team of experts. 
Three prizes were to be awarded for correct entries. This was held to be a 
contest within the meaning of Section 36(A)(3)(b). Similar schemes of the 
Competition Success Review and Amar Chitra Katha were also held to be 
contests and attracted provisions of Section 36 A(3)(b). 
 
Thus, the Commission’s position was that any campaign which had an 
element of chance through a contest, draw of lots or game of skill attracted 
the provision. However, it was not enough for a scheme to be a contest or a 
game of chance. It must further be towards promotion of sale or services. 
Since Section 36 A(3)(b) used the word ‘directly or indirectly’, the Commission 
                                             
6 See review of judgement of Mid-Day Publications Pvt. Ltd., dated March 12, 
1986 in Society For Civic Rights v Colgate Palmolive (India) Limited, 
judgement of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, 
dated 19/06/1991. Citation: 1991 (72) CC 80.   7
took the position that every campaign by a business house was towards 
promoting its products. 
 
Hereafter, in the interpretation of the provisions, two differing positions 
emerged within the Commission. The opening paragraph of Section 36 A 
contained the phrase ‘adopts one or more of the following practices and 
thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers’. One position was that this 
was an essential requirement for a trade practice to become an unfair trade 
practice. Thus, some members of the Commission required before 
condemning a scheme whether it caused ‘loss or injury to the consumer’ or 
not. The other position was that the phrase ‘thereby causes loss or injury’ was 
only descriptive of an unfair trade practice. Loss and injury was inherent in an 
unfair trade practice. Thus, once a trade practice was held to be unfair under 
any of the five sub sections of Section 36 A, no further substantiation of ‘loss 
or injury’ was to be required. We would see how the two positions were used 
by the different benches and members of the Commission, to give life to the 
provision.  
 
Element of Loss or Injury 
 
The Commission in Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. held that the beneficiaries of the 
contest were no more than about 12, 500 as against over one lakh who 
entered the contest. Only a small percentage benefited while the bulk of them 
had to suffer disappointment. Thus, the contest had caused loss or injury. In  
MecoTronics Pvt. Ltd
7 the Commission reiterated that any scheme which 
benefited a few and disappoints many had a strong element of what may be 
described as invisible loss or injury. In Parle Products Pvt. Ltd.
8, the 
Commission noted that a purchaser has to purchase much larger number of 
products than he would normally consume to enter the contest. This would 
                                                                                                                               
 
7 See review of judgement of MecoTronics Pvt. Ltd., in Society For Civic 
Rights v Colgate Palmolive (India) Limited, judgement of the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, dated 19/06/1991. Citation: 
1991 (72) CC 80. 
 
8 See review of Judgement of Parle Products Pvt. Ltd., in Society For Civic 
Rights v Colgate Palmolive (India) Limited, judgement of the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, dated 19/06/1991. Citation: 
1991 (72) CC 80. 
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increase unnecessary expenditure and financial loss if the buyer were not a 
lucky winner of a prize. Secondly, the contest promoted excessive 
consumption of sweets which created dental problems for consumers. Thus, it 
created public prejudice. 
 
However, in other cases, a different view was taken. In the British Airways 
case, the Commission held that there was no additional cost to the 
contestants. Thus, it was held that the contest did not cause any injury or loss 
to the consumers. Similarly, in cases where entry forms for contest came with 
newspaper or magazines, the Commission took the view that the participants 
had to purchase a copy to get the form. However, cost of this was nominal. 
Further, the participant had to pay no extra amount for participating in the 
context. And he got his money’s worth in the purchase.
9  
 
In their decisions, the benches of the Commission had no doubt that these 
schemes were ‘contest, lottery or game of chance or skill’ for ‘directly or 
indirectly’ promoting sales or services. However, there were multiple 
viewpoints  in interpreting the scope and significance of ‘loss or injury’. In 
some cases it was assumed that a requirement to purchase a product in order 
to participate in a contest itself was a loss. In other cases, it was reasoned 
that those who do not get a prize in a contest suffer a loss. And in yet other 
cases, it was said that the purchaser gets his money’s worth, thus, a contest 
causes no loss.  
 
 
Full Bench of the MRTPC: Colgate Trigard Case 
 
 
Eventually, to settle on the meaning of the clause, a full bench of the 
Commission was convened to decide on the Colgate Trigard Case. The 
Colgate Ltd. had advertised that a person could buy two tooth brushes to 
enter the contest. A simple set of questions on healthy brushing habits, put in 
                                             
9 See review of judgement of Mid-Day Publications Pvt. Ltd., dated March 12, 
1986, and Competition Success Review Pvt. Ltd.,in Society For Civic Rights 
v Colgate Palmolive (India) Limited, judgement of the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, dated 19/06/1991. Citation: 1991 
(72) CC 80. India Book House, In Re, decision of the MRTPC, dated 
03/06/1987. Citation: 1989 (65) CC 36. 
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a multiple answer format, were to be ticked and submitted. There were 
several awards for correct answers as well as early replies. There was no 
doubt this was a contest within the meaning of Section 36 A(3)(b). The 
unsettled point was whether it was necessary to explore if the contest caused 
‘loss or injury’ to the contestants.  
 
The Commission noted that Section 36 A listed a total of 15 practices. A trade 
practice, to become an unfair trade practice, must fall in one of the 15 
practices mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the section. The adoption of the 
practice should be for promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for 
the provisions of any services. The Commission noted:  
 
Most of the debate before us has centred on the correct meaning of 
the words "and thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers of 
such goods or services". The two interpretations are: one, the phrase 
necessarily means that the trade practice must cause loss or injury to 
the consumers before it can be branded an unfair trade practice. The 
argument on the other hand is that adoption of any of the 15 classes 
has innate character of causing loss or injury to the consumer if it 
adopts one or the other of the practices mentioned in subsequent 
paragraphs of section 36A. 
 
The Commission was clear that a superficial reading of the provision might 
make it appear that in addition to being an unfair trade practice, it also must 
be asked if it caused loss or injury to the consumer. However, the 
Commission noted that this becomes incongruous when one looks at the 5 
sub-sections of 36 A. Sub-section 5 is on hoarding, destruction of goods and 
refusal to sell. This inherently causes ‘loss or injury to the consumer’. Section 
36 A (4) is on sale of goods, not in conformity with safety standards. This can 
only cause loss or injury to the consumers. Further, false bargain price, 
provided in Section 36 A(2), can only cause loss and injury. Again, creating an 
impression that a gift or prize was free while it was being charged for, 
provided for in  Section 36 A(3)(a), will only lead to a loss for the consumer.  
 
Thus, the practices mentioned in 36 A have innate quality of causing loss or 
injury to the consumers. The key phrase, however, must mean the same 
thing to all the subsequent paragraphs. The Commission, thus, ruled: 
   10
Returning to the opening part of section 36A, we are of the opinion 
that the key phrase does not require the causing of actual loss or 
injury to the consumer. On the other hand, we are of the opinion 
that the key phrase is a part of the definition which implies that in 
every trade practice which adopts one or the other of the practices 
mentioned in the subsequent paragraphs of section 36A, loss or 
injury is implicit. 
 
By putting the phrase "thereby causing ... ", in the context of the section, the 
Commission reasoned, the legislative intention was to convey that the listed 
practices had ‘innate capacity or inherent quality of causing loss or injury to 
the consumers of the goods and services’. The purpose of adding the words 
was to indicate that ‘the trade practices described in section 36A of the Act 
are vehicles of loss or injury.’ Thus, the Commission ordered Colgate Ltd. not 
to hold such contests in the future. The judgement of the Commission was 
dated June 19, 1991. The Commission was a part of the Ministry of Company 
Affairs. It must have communicated the ambiguity in interpreting Section 36 
A. A comprehensive amendment of the MRTP Act deleted the disputed 
phrase. The amended opening paragraph instead came to read: 
 
In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires "unfair trade 
practice" means a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting 
the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provisions of any 
services, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice 
including any of the following practices,  
 
Thereafter, the MRTPC consistently took the position that a contest or a 
lottery per se was an unfair trade practice.
10 For example, Usha International 
Ltd. had announced a gift scheme to promote Usha fans where a person 
could get a discount of Rupees 30 or opt to be a part of the scheme which 
entitled him to prizes through a draw. The Commission held this to be nothing 
but a lottery.  
 
                                             
10 Director-General (Investigation and Registration) v Usha International 
Limited and Another, a judgement of the MRTPC, dated 31/10/1996. 
Citation: 1997 (89) CC 648. 
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Towards the end of January 1997, Whirlpool Ltd. had launched a 'Scratch a 
Gift Scheme'. Every purchaser of  Whirlpool refrigerator or washing machine 
was to pick a card and scratch the opaque strip on the card. Underneath the 
opaque surface, the gift offered was mentioned. This became visible on 
scratching the card. The gifts ranged from one kilogram of Aerial washing 
powder to a two-bed room apartment. The Commission considered this to be 
a lottery and thus, an unfair trade practice under Section 36 A (3)(b). The 
case had been brought before the Commission by Whirlpool’s competitor, the 
Godrej GE Appliances Ltd. The MRTP Commission granted an injunction on 
20th February, 1997. 
 
Horlicks Hidden Wealth Prize Offer Case 
 
It just took one judgement of the Supreme Court to change everything. There 
have been just five cases on the working of unfair trade practices under the 
MRTP Act on which Supreme Court has given a ruling in the past 20 years. 
One of the first cases was the Horlicks Hidden Wealth Prize Offer Case,
  




The HMM limited, manufactured and marketed Horlicks. In September 1985, 
it advertised a scheme called the "Hidden Wealth Prize offer" for the buyers in 
Delhi. A lucky purchaser of a bottle of Horlicks could find a coupon inside the 
bottle. The coupons indicated the prize. This included 5 Hotline Colour TVs, 
10 gift vouchers of Rs. 2000 each for Hotline appliances and other cash 
prizes. The prizes were to be claimed by January 15, 1986. The 
advertisements stated that even if the buyers' coupon did not carry a winning 
message, he had "several more chances to try. So get the goodness of 
Horlicks, now. Because with it, you surely can't lose!"  
 
The MRTP Commission had held this to be an unfair trade practice as the 
system of getting coupon was nothing but a lottery.
12 The Commission was of 
                                             
11 H. M. M. Ltd v. Director General, Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission, Supreme Court of India, judgement dated 11/08/1998. 
Citation: AIR 1998 SC 2691. 
 
12 See review of judgement in H. M. M. v/s DGIR of the MRTPC, dated 11-5-
1989, in  H. M. M. Ltd v. Director General, Monopolies & Restrictive Trade   12
the opinion that the prize scheme was intended to wean away the consumers 
from Bournvita by allurements of lucky prizes of high value rather than by fair 
means. Commission was of the view that such schemes did not benefit the 
general run of the consumers. According to the Commission, only a small 
fraction of the buyers of Horlicks  got the benefit of the said Scheme. Most 
got nothing. The prizes were manifold costlier than the price of a bottle of 
Horlicks, a fact on account of which the winning of the prize will be of 
overriding consideration than the product in question. The Commission, thus, 
had held: 
 
 On these postulates it is not difficult to say that the trade practice is 
no better than a lottery and that the buyer who does not get any 
prize, does lose it as against the one who wins it although both take 
to the same transaction. So the trade practice that is meant to wean 
away the consumer from Bournvita by this allurement is obviously an 
instrument of facing competition in the market by unfair means and, 
therefore, prejudicial to public interest.  
 
The MRTPC gave its judgement in 1989. In the light of its own experiences, it 
as never an issue that schemes like this were not ‘contest, lottery, game of 
chance or skill’ for ‘direct or indirect’ promotion of sales. Thus, here was no 
gain in even emphasising or elaborating the point. As the case was for a 
period prior to 1991 amendment, what was to be emphasised was that it 
caused loss or injury to the consumers. The Supreme Court, in its short 
judgement in 1998 commented that this was not a case of lottery as there 
was no: 
 
... draw of lots or that a price was charged for participation in the 
draw... The fact that some bottles of Horlicks contained a slip of paper 
which entitled the buyer to a prize is not a lottery in the ordinary 
sense of the word.’  
 
Once the Court had concluded that the scheme of coupons inside Horlicks 
bottle was not a lottery, there was no point in commenting whether it caused 
loss or injury to the consumer. The detailed reasoning of the Commission in 
                                                                                                                               
Practices Commission, Supreme Court of India, judgement dated 
11/08/1998. Citation: AIR 1998 SC 2691. 
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the Colgate Trigard Case, which was also pending in appeal before the 
Supreme Court, was not brought out. The judgement, thus, merely replied on 
the opening paragraph in Sec 36 A and held ‘‘for holding a trade practice to 
be an unfair trade practice, therefore, it must be found that it causes loss or 
injury to the consumer'. The judgement went on to further conclude that 'it is 
difficult to hold that a consumer who bought a bottle of Horlicks that did not 
entitle him to a prize suffered a loss'. 
 
While its interpretation of the phrase ‘thereby causes loss or injury’ was of 
limited relevance as the provision itself had been amended, that such 
schemes were not lottery was to have a wide impact on the subsequent 
judgements of the MRTP Commission. From the organisation and tenor, it 
does not appear that the judgement was intended to be applied as a binding 
principle for all promotional schemes. The judgement was more to settle the 
immediate case. The few lines in the judgement could not have been taken as 
binding principles. What if the HMM Ltd. had introduced the same prizes 
through a different modality? Instead of some bottles containing prize-bearing 
coupons, every bottle contained a coupon with a number. The winners of the 
prizes were to be decided through a draw. The two schemes are the same, 
yet, if we were to apply the HMM decision, the first would not be a lottery 
while the second would be a lottery, as it has a draw.  
 
Another reason the judgement could not have been intended to be setting  
guiding principle for all promotional schemes was inconsistencies which would 
arise in its application. The judgement commented that a prize scheme was 
not a lottery in the ‘ordinary sense of the word’. But the word ‘lottery’ in 
Section 36 A(3)(b) is not used in the ordinary sense of the word. It is used in 
relation to a manufacturer using a lottery to promote sales. If a person were 
to pay for a lottery ticket and participate in it, it would only be a lottery, 
incapable of bearing a relationship with promotion of sale. For it to be a 
lottery for promotion of sales or services, the sale transaction must 
necessarily be tied up with the lottery. In other words, the price paid by the 
buyer for the good, the chance of getting a prize and actually getting it, must 
be tied with one another. Further, the word lottery appears in conjunction 
with several other words ‘any contest, .... game of chance or skill’ where a 
payment of money is not necessary.  
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Judgement of the Commission- Post- HMM Case 
 
Coca Cola Ltd. Case 
 
The judgements of the Supreme Court are binding on all other courts. But this 
would be only to the extent the Supreme Court categorically sets out binding 
principles. The Commission, in its judgement, felt obliged to simply follow the 
judgement of the Supreme Court in the HMM case. Coca Cola Ltd.
13 had 
introduced a promotional scheme for its drink Coke. A lucky winners could get 
a flat in Mumbai, Honda City Car, Mobile phones and Walkmans. The case 
was brought before the Commission by its rival Pepsi that it was a lottery 
under Sec 36 A (3)(b). The Commission had taken it up as an unfair trade 
practice before the Supreme Court gave its HMM Case Judgement.  Later, the 
Commission said the case was very much like the HMM case, and thus, not a 
lottery. 
 
Whirlpool ‘scratch a gift scheme’ Case 
 
The Whirlpool Ltd.
 14  was back before the Commission to get the interim 
injunction lifted on its ‘scratch a gift scheme’ in the light of the HMM case. In 
the earlier instance, the Commission was convinced that the scheme involved 
an element of chance or luck and was, therefore, prima facie, violated section 
36A(3) of the Act. It had, thus, put an interim injunction on Whirlpool to stop 
the scheme. The Commission, post-HMM Ltd. case, reversed its reasoning.  
Citing similarity with the HMM case, it observed: 
 
In this case also there is no draw of lots nor any price charged for 
participation in the scheme. Each participant got the value for his or 
her money and in addition stood a chance for winning a prize. 
 
                                             
13 The MRTPC made this order on 9th October, 1998 in the case Devyani 
Breverages Ltd. v. Coca Cola Ltd. See summary of judgement in Godrej G. 
E. Appliances Limited v Whirlpool of India Limited, MRTP Commission, 
judgement dated 10/02/1999. Citation: 1999 (2) CPJ 41A. 
 
14 Godrej G. E. Appliances Limited v Whirlpool of India Limited, MRTP 
Commission, judgement dated 10/02/1999. Citation: 1999 (2) CPJ 41A. 
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According to the Commission, the Whirlpool case was on even sounder 
foundation as: 
 
  ... while some purchasers of Horlicks in the 'Hidden Wealth Prize 
Offer' did not get any prize, in the 'Scratch a Gift Scheme' of the 
respondent, every purchaser of scheme would get gifts though of 
varied values. 
 
Usha ‘Better Fans, Better Gifts’  Case 
 
Usha International Ltd., engaged in the business of marketing Usha fans 
manufactured by Jay Engineering Works Ltd., in February 1986, had started a 
scheme called  ‘Better Fans, Better Gifts!’ The scheme offered  prizes like 
cars, scooters, tape-recorders etc. On purchase of a fan, the dealer would 
give the purchaser a sealed envelope containing the name of the gift. A gift 
for every one was ensured which was a discount of Rs. 30 or so. The 
Commission had ruled in 1996
15: 
 
That the impugned scheme has an element of chance cannot be 
denied as the bigger prizes are predicated on chance rather than skill. 
A game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome, is a 
game of chance ... it also has an element of chance for a prize for a 
price. The essential elements of a lottery are consideration, prize and 
chance and any scheme by which a person for a consideration is 
permitted to receive a prize as may be determined predominantly by 
chance. In other words, the receipt of a prize in a game of chance is 
not a result of human reason, foresight, sagacity or design but is a 
result of chance. 
 
The Commission refuted the point that since every one was assured a gift, 
there was no chance. The Commission ruled that the bigger prizes ‘were 
securable by purchasers only by chance’. And thus, the scheme attracted 
Section 36A(3)(b). 
 
After HMM judgement, the Commission reversed its reasoning: 
                                             
15 Director-General (Investigation and Registration) v Usha International 
Limited and Another, 31/10/1996, Citation: 1997 (89) CC 648. 
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In a lottery or game of chance while some participants get the prizes 
offered, other remain deprived of the same. This does not appear to 
be the case with the respondent's scheme. The distinguishable feature 
of the impugned scheme is that every buyer gets some prize or the 
other be it small or big cash discount or some other prize. This 
eliminates the possibility of the gift-scheme being totally a game of 
chance. This being so, the prize scheme of the respondent does not 
infringe upon the provisions of section 36A(3)(b).  
 
 
National Panasonic Prize Contest Case
16 
 
The National Panasonic India Private Limited had launched a prize contest in 
1997. A person had to buy a Panasonic television to enter the contest. The 
prizes included a trip for two persons to witness the Winter Olympics in 
Japan, the second prize was two Panasonic Mini Hi-Fi systems with 5 CD 
changer and the third prize three Panasonic G-400 cellular phones and 500 
consolation prizes. It was alleged before the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission that the prize contest constituted an unfair trade 
practice. 
 
The Commission, relying on the HMM Case, summarised its position: 
 
This Commission had an occasion to consider the aforesaid binding 
ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases where the prize 
scheme was floated by certain business houses. ... It has been held by 
this Commission in those cases that such prize scheme would not fall 
within the purview of Section 36A(3)(b) of the MRTP Act for the 
simple reason that the purchaser of an item with which the prize 
scheme is attached gets his money's worth and he gets the additional 
benefit of participating in the scheme in question.  
 
                                             
16 The National Panasonic India Private Limited v. Director General 
(Investigation and Registration), MRTP commission, dated 05/10/1999. 
Citation: 2000 (1) CPJ 14. 
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In the cases involving interpretation of the word ‘lottery’, one could 
understand that the Commission was constrained to follow the HMM 
decision. The Commission extended it to all schemes. It further noted: 
 
This Commission has also considered what would be a lottery in its 
acceptable meaning. It has been understood to mean payment of a 
price for winning a prize. That would be applicable even for a game of 
chance or a contest in its strict sense. In order to win a prize in a 
contest or in a game of chance or in a lottery one has to pay a price.  
 
Applying its principle to the case in hand, the Commission noted: 
 
In the scheme in question, the purchaser of a T.V. would get his 
money's worth in the form of the T.V. itself. He has not to pay any 
separate price for participating in the scheme by whatever name or 
nomenclature it may be styled, whether as a contest, a game of 
chance or a lottery. If that be so, we are of the opinion that the 
scheme would not fall within the purview of the aforesaid statutory 
provision contained in Section 36A(3)(b) of the MRTP Act. 
 
This extension would not be consistent with the HMM case. As we have 
noticed, as a part of several other considerations, the Supreme Court had 
noted that ‘lottery in the ordinary sense of the word’ would require a ‘price’ to 
be paid for a ‘draw’. Following the judgement, we should go by the meaning 
of ‘contest’, ‘game of chance’ or ‘game of skill’ in their ‘ordinary sense of the 
word’. While a ‘lottery’ necessarily requires purchase of a ticket, a contest or 
game of chance or skill does not have a requirement of a price in its ‘ordinary 
sense of the word’. Each of the key words in Section 36 A(3)B should have 
been appraised on their own. Instead, the definition of ‘lottery’ got extended 
to all schemes.  
 
Further Endorsement of the HMM Case 
 
The Colgate Trigard case, the one in which the Commission had at length 
commented on the phrase ‘loss and injury’, was pending before the Supreme 
Court since 1991. The Supreme Court came to rule on it in 2002. The two 
judges in the HMM case were justice Barucha and Pattanaik. Justice Barucha   18
had retired and Justice Pattanaik was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court, in another short judgement, ruled
17: 
 
It is now a well-settled principle of law that a literal meaning should 
be assigned to a statute unless the same leads to anomaly or 
absurdity. The terminology used in the provisions is absolutely clear 
and unambiguous.  
 
The MRTP Commission had applied this principle itself. It had recognised that 
literal meaning was ‘incongruous’ that it went on to harmonise its meaning. 
The Supreme Court reiterated: 
 
In H.M.M. Ltd's case (supra), this Court has clearly held that for 
holding a trade practice to be an unfair trade practice, it must be 
found that it had caused loss or injury to the consumer. 
 
It must be recognised that the judgement in the Colgate Trigard Case was on 
the question of interpretation of the phrase ‘loss and injury’. The judgement, 
however, by relying on the HMM Ltd. case, in some sense, endorsed the HMM 
case in its entirety.  
 
Thus, after 20 years of introduction of a law to regulate unfair practices in 
holding of games and contests, the interpretation of the law has effectively 
left the field without any regulation. On the other hand, the competitive thrust 
has led firms to vigorous promotion of their products. The newspaper and 
television channels are full of contests and draws to entice consumers. Each 
promotion scheme is more fantastic than the other. No firm wants to be left 
behind by the others. Several of the cases alleging unfair trade practice have 
been brought before the Commission by the competitors themselves. 
 
More than answers, several questions arise. One could ask what was the 
original intention of introducing the clause? The provision came on the 
recommendations of the Sachar Committee, constituted in 1977, to make 
recommendations for the amendments in the MRTP Act. The Sachar 
                                             
17 Colgate Palmolive (India) Limited v Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission and others, Judgement of the Supreme Court, 
dated 20 Nov, 2002. Citation: 2002 Indlaw SC 1407. 
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Committee proposed introduction of a chapter on unfair trade practices. This 
was eventually introduced by the amendment of the MRTP Act in 1984. 
 
The para on holding of contests, that is, Section 36 A (3)(b), was borrowed 
from the Sachar Committee report. The Sachar Committee report had 
recommended that holding of a contest or game of chance etc was to be an 
unfair trade practice and to be stopped. The exception in which it could be 
allowed was: 
 
Adequate and fair disclosure of the number and approximate value of 
the prizes, of the area or areas to which they relate and of any fact 




In addition, there must be fairness and transparency in selection of 
participants and distribution of prizes. In the enactment, the above exception 
under which a contest could legitimately be held was not included. Perhaps, 
the intention was to prohibit holding of contests and games altogether. 
Alternately, the draftsmen may have subsumed all qualifications and 
exceptions by requiring that after a practice is held to an Unfair Trade 
Practice, the Commission would order cease and desist under Section 36 D if 
the practice was ‘prejudicial to the public interest, or to the interest of any 
consumer or consumers generally.’ 
 
One could ask the practices which are followed and the law in the developed 
world. Sachar Committee had picked up and synthesised the provisions then, 
in 1977, in the USA, UK, Australia and Canada. Much the way the Indian law 
has evolved in these years, albeit to have no law, so have the law in these 
countries in the context of the practices and court ruling. It would be a 
different exercise to review the law in these countries. Suffice it to mention 
here that the law in the western world has become even more stringent for 
holding games, contests and lotteries for promotion of sales.
19  
 
                                             
18 Government of India, (1978) ‘Report of the High-powered Expert Committee 
on Companies & MRTP Acts’, August, 1978, Ministry of Law, Justice and 
Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.  
 
19 See a review of law in the US at www.adlaw.com 
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The changed context of liberalisation and globalisation required better 
mechanism for regulating business practices and settling disputes. The 
reverse seems to have happened in India. Even the limited protection 
available through the MRTP Act has gone away. The MRTP Act regulated 
monopolies, and restrictive trade practices an unfair trade practices. The 
Government of India constituted a Commission to recommend legislative 
measures for protecting and enhancing competition in the economy. 
Following the recommendations of the Competition Commission, the 
government has repealed the MRTP Act. Instead, a Competition Act has been 
enacted to regulate monopolies and anti-competitive or restrictive trade 
practices. This is to be done by creating Competition Councils in different 
regions of India. The Competition Commission was of the view that the 
Competition Act should not be burdened with unfair trade practices.
20 This 
was instead, to be given effect under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
 
While the Consumer Protect Act was being enacted in 1986, the provisions on 
unfair trade practices had already had a life for two years under the MRTP 
Act. Since a consumer needed protection not only from being supplied with 
defective good and deficient service, but also unfair trade practices, the 
provisions on unfair trade practices were copied from the MRTP Act into the 
Consumer Protection Act. The Consumer Protect Act creates three tiered 
quasi-judicial bodies, District Forum, State Forum and National Forum, 
through which a consumer can seek remedy. While the consumer forums 
have judged large number of cases on ‘defect in good’ or ‘deficiency in 
service’, the provisions on unfair trade practice have almost never been 
contested before the Consumer forums. The cases on unfair trade practices 
were taken to the MRTP Commission.  
 
The provisions on Unfair Trade Practices, in the course of being copied from 
the MRTP Act into the structure of the Consumer Protection Act, have 
acquired a new meaning. Within the Consumer Protection Act, a ‘consumer’ 
cannot take up a case of an Unfair Trade Practice before a consumer forum. 
It can only be a consumer association, central government and the State 
Governments.   
 
                                             
20 Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law, May 
2000, see at www.nic.in/dca/comp   21
 
Second, in the arrangement of the MRTP Act, Section 36 A had listed all unfair 
practices. However, every practice falling under Section 36 A, though called 
Unfair Trade Practice, was not to be prohibited. Under Section 36 D, only if 
the Commission concluded that  ‘the practice is prejudicial to the public 
interest, or to the interest of any consumer or consumers generally’ was the 
practice to be concluded. The listing of Section 36 A has been copied as 
‘unfair trade practice’ while the limitation of Section 36 D has not been taken. 
Section 14 gives the right to a consumer to have an unfair trade practice 
discontinued. Thus, within the Consumer Protection Act, all games, lotteries 
and similar schemes, without qualifications, could be prohibited. Only cases 
before the consumer forums would settle whether this is a conscious choice of 




This paper was intended to explore micro-details of working of business law. 
One cannot generalise from a specific focused illustration. There could only be 
tentative formulations and proposals for further investigation. Some of these 
inter-related issues are as follows. One, opening up of the economy, on its 
own, is not going to create and sustain competition. Appropriate law, 
adequate enforcement and quick dispute settlement mechanism would be 
needed to sustain competition in the economy. Two, changes in law come on 
the behest and initiative of some group. It should not be assumed that 
industry, even in the era of ‘globalisation-liberalisation’, would necessarily 
demand for laws conducive to competition. There may be several reasons for 
this. It may instead organise its practices around the existing law. Three, 
much the way the state steered the economy in the ‘license-permit raj’, the 
state would need to be centre-stage in continually reforming legislative 
environment to create and sustain competition in the economy. Four, India 
had made a new beginning after Independence. This required significant 
knowledges in several field to create and manage a ‘command economy’. 
India has made another beginning as a ‘liberalised-globalised’ economy. The 
emergent context of India is new and unfamiliar to us. We would need to 
create newer frameworks and generate knowledges anew to understand this 
unfolding and better manage the economy and society. It would not be 
inappropriate to summarise by another quotation from Mr. Chidambaram’s 
article:   22
 
A world class legal system is absolutely essential to support an 
economy that aims to be world class. India needs to take a hard 
look at its commercial laws and the system of dispensing justice in 
commercial matters. A beginning needs to be made at both ends — 
creation of a Commercial Court division within each High Court and 
the training of judges in the civil and criminal courts. There is no 
shame in admitting our inadequacies. Lawyers and judges need 
training in economic and commercial matters. Likewise, economists 
and subject-matter experts need training in legal principles. 
Together, they will constitute the legal infrastructure that will have 
the capacity to deal with the myriad problems that will arise in a 
growing and globalised economy.  
 